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A combination of a priority queueing model and mean field theory shows the emergence of traders’
swarm behavior, even when each has a subjective prediction of the market driven by a limit order
book. Using a nonlinear Markov model, we analyze the dynamics of traders who select a favorable
order price taking into account the waiting cost incurred by others. We find swarm behavior emerges
because of the delay in trader reactions to the market, and the direction of the swarm is decided
by the current market position and the intensity of zero-intelligent random behavior, rather than
subjective trader predictions.
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Stock markets use a double auction system with a limit
order book (LOB) [1], where traders place their sell and
buy orders with a specific price (limit orders), as well
as their orders with no specific price (market orders),
which executed against the most favorable limit orders.
Because the LOB is the key micro-structure mechanism
of the stock market, there are numerous mathematical
and empirical analyses of the LOB, which mainly try to
understand the observed order distribution on the LOB
and the price formation process based on some assump-
tions of trader behavior [1–6] and possibly to derive the
optimal order-placing strategy [7, 8]. Some of them used
Markov processes including queueing model to describe
the behavior of the LOB [9–11]. At the same time, as
Keynes famous quote about stock markets as a beauty
contest [12], we need to take into account the higher-
order expectation of other traders’ belief (the expectation
of what others predict the belief of others) to understand
the market dynamics [13].
Here, we use the concept of mean field game theory
[6, 14–18] incorporating the higher-order belief of traders
as Picard iteration ([19] for example), and analyze the
behavior of traders who act to maximize their rewards
by placing their orders in the LOB modeled by a priority
queue [20]. Specifically, we study the effect of the delay of
traders reactions with a non-linear Markov process [21],
which leads to the emergence of swarm behavior, and
we show that the swarm depends on the current market
position and the intensity of random behavior rather than
subjective trader predictions.
A simplified one-sided LOB [11] can be modeled by a
priority queue [20] (see Figure 1). Assume that there is a
population of traders that wants to sell stocks. Traders
place their sell orders selecting the prices either θ1 or
θ2 (∆θ = θ2 − θ1 > 0, generally ∆θ is fixed to a small
value) in the LOB. The sell orders with different prices
will be put into two queues, and wait to be executed with
a matching market buy order. The lower-price queue
denoted by θ1 is given the priority, and each queue is
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FIG. 1. A priority queue modelling of a one-sided LOB.
Traders select the prices of their sell orders (θ1 < θ2). The θ1
queue is executed with the high priority. Sell and Buy orders
arrive as independent Poisson processes with the rate λ and
µ, and the ratio of θ1-sell orders is p.
served on a first-come-first-serve basis.
We assume that limit sell orders and market buy orders
arrive at the LOB as independent Poisson processes with
the rate λ and the rate µ, respectively. Let p be the ratio
of θ1 sell orders. An arriving market buy order will be
cleared with a limit sell order at the head of the priority
θ1 queue, if there is one. If there is no sell order in the θ1
queue, the buy order is executed with the sell order at the
head of θ2. When there is no order in either queue, the
buy order will be canceled. We consider a buy-dominant
market, which implies ρ = λ/µ < 1. Thus, all sell orders
will be executed eventually.
When they place a sell order, traders consider its cost
for waiting time until execution, which is denoted by c
per unit time, and their reward Ri when selecting the
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2price θi is:
Ri = θi − cWi, i = 1, 2,
where Wi is the waiting time until the θi order is exe-
cuted. By placing a θ1 order, traders expect their orders
to be sold more quickly than θ2 orders and reduce the
waiting cost, at the expense of selling them at a lower
price.
Traders optimize their behavior according to the wait-
ing cost incurred by the behavior of other traders. Here
are some intuitions: (1) a trader should select θ1 if many
others select it, or his or her order will be delayed by
θ1 orders, however (2) when others do not select θ1, his
or her order will not be severely-delayed and selecting
θ2 is better. Thus, the decision should be affected by
cost structure as well as the prediction of other traders’
decisions.
Consider a trader Alice who estimates the waiting cost
to sell her stock over [0, T ] to make the decision at time 0.
Let p be the ratio of traders selecting θ1 in the market.
Because orders are executed rapidly, Alice can assume
her orders to enter the priority queue of the LOB in the
stationary state. By the conservation law of the work-
load of priority queues ([20] and Supporting Material ),
we have the following estimate for the expected waiting
times:
E[W1] =
1
(µ− λp) ,
E[W2] =
µ
(µ− λ)(µ− λp) ,
in the stationary priority queue. If many traders select
the higher priority (θ1) orders (large p), then the waiting
times to be executed become large in the both queues,
but the orders with the lower priority (θ2 orders) suffer
more severely, since ρ = λ/µ < 1.
Define the value g as the expected gain from selecting
the lower price θ1:
g(p, c) = E[R1]− E[R2] (1)
= (θ1 − cE[W1])− (θ2 − cE[W2])
=
ρc/µ
(1− ρ)(1− ρp) −∆θ,
which is an increasing function of p. Note that the g-value
is negative when c is small, while g is positive when p and
ρ are large.
Figure 2 illustrates the typical g-value on the (p, c)-
plane in a slightly buy-dominant market (ρ = 0.9), which
shows that the traders will change their behavior accord-
ing to the behavior of other traders. At the point A in
the (p, c)-plane, the cost of waiting is large (positive g-
value) and Alice selects θ1 to increase her reward. On
the other hand, at the point B, the cost of waiting is
negligible and Alice gains more reward by selecting θ2.
The point C is on the boundary g(p, c) = 0, and Alice’s
selection will not affect her reward. This boundary is an
unstable Nash-equilibrium [20].
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FIG. 2. The g-value of g(p, c), which is the expected gain
to select θ1. Here we set ∆θ = 1 and ρ = 0.9. The line
{p = 0, g < 0} on the red region and {p = 1, g > 0} on the
green region are both stable equilibrium, while the boundary
g(p, c) = 0 is unstable.
Thus, Alice can decide her strategy according to the g-
value given other traders’ behavior p and the cost struc-
ture c. However, in general, she should predict other
traders’ behavior p in the future market, because it will
take some time for her to implement her strategy.
Suppose that at time 0 Alice has an arbitrary ini-
tial prediction of the future market ratio of selecting
θ1 as x
a = (xa(t))t∈[0,T ] given the known current ratio
xa(0) = p0. Now Alice picks a trader Bob and analyzes
his behavior through a thought experiment assuming the
market (traders other than Bob) follows her prediction.
Alice also assumes that Bob changes his behavior accord-
ing to the two-state non-homogeneous Markov process
with the infinitesimal generator:
Q[xa(t)] =
( −α1(xa(t)) α1(xa(t))
α2(x
a(t)) −α2(xa(t))
)
and the master (Kolmogorov) differential equation:
dxa1(t)
dt
= −α1(xa(t))xa1(t) + α2(xa(t))(1− xa1(t)),
where xa1(t) = P{Bob selects θ1 at time t}, and α1(p)
and α2(p) are functions of Alice’s prediction of market
p = xa(t) and defined by
α1(p) = β + αg
−(p, c),
α2(p) = β + αg
+(p, c).
3Here, g+(p, c) = max(0, g(p, c)) and g−(p, c) =
−min(0, g(p, c)), and α and β are some non-negative
constants. The instantaneous transition rate α1(p) and
α2(p) are interpreted as follows. Under the market p, Bob
changes his selection with the rate proportional to the
gain obtained if he changed his selection. The term β ≥ 0
represents the possibility of random behavior change ir-
relevant to his expected gain (zero-intelligence behavior
[1, 8]). Using this Markov chain model, Alice takes into
account that Bob changes his strategy quickly if he gains
more but he always needs time to adapt to the market
change.
Now Alice expects that Bob select his order price ac-
cording to the probability xa1 . Because other traders and
the market as a whole change their strategies just as Bob
does, she must change her prediction of the market to xa1
from xa. With her new market prediction xa1 , Alice cal-
ibrates her prediction about Bob’s behavior again based
on the marker xa1 , and then she obtains a newer predic-
tion xa2 of Bob’s behavior. She can repeat this procedure
and get her n-th prediction xan based on the market x
a
n−1
satisfying
dxan(t)
dt
= −α1(xan−1(t))xan(t) + α2(xan−1(t))(1− xan(t)),
(2)
with the known initial condition xan(0) = p0. Using the
argument similar to Picard iteration ([19] for example),
we can show that
xan(t)→ x(t), (3)
uniformly on the finite interval [0, T ] as n → ∞ for an
unique smooth function x (see Supplemental Material for
the detail). Taking n → ∞ in (2), we can show that x
satisfies
dx(t)
dt
= −α1(x(t))x(t) + α2(x(t))(1− x(t)). (4)
with the initial condition x(0) = p0, which is a two-state
nonlinear Markov process [21].
Generally, nonlinear differential equations such as (4)
does not necessarily have a unique solution. However, the
limit x is irrelevant to Alice’s initial expectation xa, but
only depends on the current market position p0 because
of the Lipschitz continuity of α1 and α2 (see Supplemen-
tal Material). Further, another trader Charlie, who may
have a different initial prediction xc in the market, yet
shares the same information about the current market
p0, must reach the same conclusion as Alice (this is the
reason we dropped the superscript a of x in (3)). Thus,
Alice, Bob, Charlie and all other traders reach the same
limit prospect x of the future market, and then all traders
act similarly according to their own interests based on
the future market x, and a swarm behavior of traders
emerges, even though each has the different initial sub-
jective predictions on the market.
Figure 3 - 5 illustrate examples how the limit behavior
achieved by updating traders’ expectations in the case
when the random switching effect is small (β = 0.1).
There, pe is the critical ratio of the market that satisfies
g(p, c) = 0. As seen in Figure 2, if p is greater than pe, it
is better to select the lower price θ1. We only show the
result when there is a non-stable equilibrium pe in the
market (0 < pe < 1), as otherwise trader’s selections are
obvious. All examples show the convergence of updates
xn to the limit x, and thus swarm behaviors emerge.
Figure 3 shows an example of three different initial
predictions of traders: decreasing (Alice), oscillating step
(Bob) and static (Charlie), starting from the same cur-
rent market p0 = 0.9, which is higher than the critical
value pe just like the position A in Figure 2. The re-
peated updates of prediction (green lines with gradation)
by (2), eventually converge to a unique common prospec-
tive market x (yellow line) satisfying (4), and all three
traders will agree to select the lower price θ1. It is worth
to note that even when the initial future prediction is
strong (see the middle graph, Bob’s initial prediction is
x0(0+) = 0 and to select θ2), the trader corrects the pre-
diction for a weaker one (to select θ1). This is because
the delay in traders reactions to the market always guar-
antees more traders selecting θ1 in short term, even when
the most immediate initial subjective prediction tells the
trader to select θ2.
Figure 4 shows the case when the current market is
below pe (p0 = 0.7 < pe). Unlike the previous case, the
limit prospect (4), suggests the selection of θ2, even when
the initial subjective prediction suggests the selection of
θ1 in the future.
Figure 5 depicts the updates (2) in the market starting
with the critical value pe and without random change
(β = 0). In this case, although the current market is in
the unstable equilibrium, the predictions converge to the
unstable equilibrium.
The random zero-intelligence behavior of traders is
captured by β, which also influences the swarm limit x
(green lines with gradation from β = 0 to β = 0.25), as
seen in Figure 6. The smaller the random effect β, the
more dependent on the initial value p0. Thus, the swarm
limit x depends on both the current market p0 and the
random behavior β. The gradient to θ1 (the right hand
side of (4)) at the time 0 on the (p0, β)-plane is depicted
in Figure 7, which shows the complex response to the pa-
rameters. This is because the random behavior of traders
makes the system mean-reverting to p = 1/2, while the
boundaries p = 0 and p = 1 are stable equilibriums.
Traditionally, the difference among traders’ subjec-
tive predictions in the market is believed to randomize
traders’ behavior [22], however our analysis may suggest
that traders’ subjective predictions will eventually con-
verges and the randomness of market is mainly caused
by the zero-intelligence behaviors.
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FIG. 3. Example of the market prediction by three traders
starting from the current market ratio p0 = 0.9. The first 30
updates of predictions (green lines with gradation) are shown
with the different traders (blue lines); decreasing, oscillating
step and static function. All have different initial predictions,
but eventually they are corrected to the unique limit (yellow
line) satisfying (4). Here we set ∆θ = 1, ρ = 0.9, c = 0.03, α =
5, β = 0.1. The critical ratio is pe = 0.811111.
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6SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Expected Waiting Times E[W1] and E[W2]
Here we summarize the known results for M/M/1
priority queues required for analyzing the LOB (see
[11, 20, 23]).
The waiting time of a M/M/1 queue with Poisson ar-
rival (the rate λ) and the exponential service time (the
rate µ) is 1/(µ−λ), when ρ = λ/µ < 1 and the queue is in
the stationary state. In the LOB model, the service time
corresponds to the time required for the most favorable
order to be executed, which equals to the inter-arrival
time of buy market orders.
Let p be the ratio of traders who place θ1 orders, and
assume that the priority queue is in the stationary state.
Since low-prioritized θ2 orders do not affect the high-
priority θ1 queue, the latter can be modeled by a M/M/1
queue with the arrival rate λp. Thus, E[W1] = 1/(µ −
λp). In addition, the aggregated mean waiting time of the
θ1 and θ2 queues, which can be estimated by an another
M/M/1 queue with the arrival rate λ, is 1/(µ−λ), since
the total waiting time (workload) is indifferent to whether
or not the priority is adopted (the priority to one order
is always compensated by the delay of others). Thus, by
the conservation law of workload, we have
1
µ− λ = pE[W1] + (1− p)E[W2].
Re-arranging the terms, we obtain the expected waiting
time in θ2 as
E[W2] =
µ
(µ− λ)(µ− λp) .
Picard-like Iteration of Market Prediction
Here we prove the uniform convergence of the Picard-
like iteration xn to a unique function x on the finite in-
terval [0, T ] as in (3).
Let g(p, c) be the function defined by
g(p, c) =
ρc/µ
(1− ρ)(1− ρp) −∆θ,
as in (1). Then, g(p, c) is Lipschitz continuous in p ∈
[0, 1]. Indeed, since g(p, c) is convex and
∂g
∂p
(p, c) ≤ ∂g
∂p
(1, c) =
ρ2c/µ
(1− ρ)3 ,
we have
|g(p, c)− g(q, c)| ≤ ρ
2c/µ
(1− ρ)3 |p− q|.
Let a(p) = −{α1(p) + α2(p))} = −2β − α|g(p, c)| and
b(p) = α2(p) = β + αg
+(p, c). Since g(p, c) is Lipchitz
continuous and bounded function of p ∈ [0, 1], so are the
functions a(p) and b(p).
Given an arbitrary measurable function x(t) that has
the value in [0, 1], consider a non-homogeneous differen-
tial equation for u:
d
dt
u(t) = a(x(t))u(t) + b(x(t)), (5)
with the initial condition u(0) = p0, which is equivalent
to the integral equation:
u(t) = p0e
∫ t
0
a(x(s))ds +
∫ t
0
b(x(s))e
∫ t
s
a(x(s′))ds′ds.
We give a useful lemma to evaluate the difference of
the solutions of (5).
Lemma 1. Given two arbitrary functions x(t) and y(t),
consider two differential equations:
d
dt
u(t) = a(x(t))u(t) + b(x(t)),
d
dt
v(t) = a(y(t))u(t) + b(y(t)),
with the common initial condition u(0) = v(0) = p0.
Then, there exists a constant L > 0 such that for all
t ∈ [0, T ],
|u(t)− v(t)| ≤ L
∫ t
0
|x(s)− y(s)|ds.
Proof. Since both a(p) and b(p) are Lipchitz continuous
and bounded functions on [0, 1], we have
d
dt
|u(t)− v(t)| ≤ L1|u(t)− v(t)|+ L2|x(t)− y(t)|,
for some positive constant L1 and L2. By Gronwall in-
equality, we have
|u(t)− v(t)| ≤ |u(0)− v(0)|eL1t +
∫ t
0
L2|x(s)− y(s)|eL1(t−s)ds
≤ L
∫ t
0
|x(s)− y(s)|ds,
where L = L2e
L1T .
Given an arbitrary initial measurable function x0(t)
with the initial value x0(0) = p0, we define the Picard-
like iteration xn by
xn(t) = p0e
∫ t
0
a(xn−1(s))ds +
∫ t
0
b(xn−1(s))e
∫ t
s
a(xn−1(s′))ds′ds,
7which is equivalent to
d
dt
xn(t) = a(xn−1(t))xn(t) + b(xn−1(t)),
with the initial condition xn(0) = p0. Note that the
original Picard iteration is derived from dxn(t)/dt =
a(xn−1(t))xn−1(t) + b(xn−1(t)) (see [19] for example),
which is slightly different than ours.
Since both values x0(t) and x1(t) are always in [0, 1],
|x1(t)− x0(t)| ≤ 1. By Lemma 1,
|x2(t)− x1(t)| ≤ L
∫ t
0
|x1(s)− x0(s)|ds ≤ Lt.
Inductively, we can show
|xn+1(t)− xn(t)| ≤ (Lt)
k
k!
,
and for all t ∈ [0, T ],
∞∑
n=0
|xn+1(t)− xn(t)| ≤ eLt.
Hence, by Weierstrass M-test, the infinite sum∑∞
n=0(xn+1(t) − xn(t)) converges uniformly on [0, T ].
Then,
xn(t) = x0(t) +
n∑
k=0
(xk+1(t)− xk(t))
→ x0(t) +
∞∑
k=0
(xk+1(t)− xk(t)) = x(t),
uniformly on [0, T ] as n → ∞. The function x(t) is well
defined by this limit.
By the uniform convergence of xn to x, we can deduce
that the limit x satisfies
x(t) = p0e
∫ t
0
a(x(s))ds +
∫ t
0
b(x(s))e
∫ t
s
a(x(s′))ds′ds,
which is equivalent to
d
dt
x(t) = a(x(t))u(t) + b(x(t)),
with the initial condition u(0) = p0. This proved the
existence of the limit x starting from x0.
Consider two different iterations xn and yn starting
from two different functions x0 and y0 with the common
initial condition: x0(0) = y0(0) = p0. By the fact |x0(t)−
y0(t)| ≤ 1 and Lemma 1, we have
|x1(t)− y1(t)| ≤ L
∫ t
0
|x0(s)− y0(s)|ds ≤ Lt.
Thus, by the similar inductive arguments, we have the
bound for the infinite sum:
∞∑
n=0
|xn(t)− yn(t)| < eLT ,
which suggests
|xn(t)− yn(t)| → 0.
Thus,
|x(t)− y(t)| ≤ |x(t)− xn(t)|+ |xn(t)− yn(t)|+ |yn(t)− y(t)| → 0.
This shows that the limit of Picard iteration x is inde-
pendent of the choice of initial function x0.
